Ryan Reeder
Political Science 170
March 24, 1999
Despite corruption reaching to some of the highest levels of the Mexican government and the failings of Mexico in several categories of drug enforcement, the United States Congress recertified Mexico as a "fully cooperative all[y] in fighting illegal drugs," rather than decertify the nation and risk possible alienation (NYT, "U.S. Gives Colombia and Mexico Nod on Drugs," Feb. 27, 1999). This recertification came in the wake of a recent visit to Mexico by President Bill Clinton on Feb. 14-15, during which he and Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo discussed the "sincerity and valor of the Mexican campaign against drugs and drug-related corruption" including a "recently announced $500 million initiative," among other non drug related issues (NYT, "Clinton Indicates He Will Support Mexico on Drugs," Feb. 16, 1999). This decision emphasized the overriding economic and political agendas, and questioned the effectiveness of the annual certification process in the drug regime.
To understand the current narcotics regime in Mexico, it is helpful to define the events which brought it about. The certification process comes from "a 1986 law [concerning] countries where drugs are produced or transported" (NYT, "U.S. Is Brushing Off Mexico's Drug Data," Feb. 14, 1999). It mandates that the current administration must report to Congress by March 1 whether a particular nation is a reliable partner in the drug war. Congress then has three choices. It can decertify a nation, which, "in theory. . .disqualifies a country from receiving American economic aid or multilateral development loans" (NYT, "U.S.Gives Colombia and Mexico Nod on Drugs," Feb. 27, 1999). It can state that a nation "is not fully cooperating, but waive the accompanying economic penalties on national-security [sic] grounds" (NYT, "Judging the Mexican Drug War", Feb. 15, 1999). Or it can recertify a nation as a fully cooperating partner in the war on drugs. Was it a rational decision to recertify Mexico? Did the benefits exceed the costs in this case? After analyzing the evidence, I would conclude that it was.
U.S. officials "first offered to support the Mexican military's drug enforcement efforts in early 1995" (NYT, "U.S. Help for Mexican Military Has Not Curtailed Drug Traffic," Dec. 23, 1998). This was because Colombian traffickers were flying loads of cocaine on passenger jets which easily outran the relatively slow Mexican police aircraft (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998). So the U.S. asked Mexico to start using F-5 fighter jets instead (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998). Although this initial plan was unsuccessful, it led to other, broader plans dealing with U.S. and Mexican cooperation (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998). These included a donation of seventy-three Vietnam-era UH-1H helicopters and the training of Mexican troops in the United States (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998). However, since late 1995, drug traffickers have stopped using jet aircraft as a method of importation, and thehelicopters have fallen into disuse (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998). In addition, Mexican commanders claim that they do not need or can't afford the training of Mexican soldiers in the United States, (a meal allowance cost of $25/soldier/day) and are planning on "cutting the flow of troops by about 40 percent" during 1999 (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998). Because of these problems, the U.S-Mexican drug regime was basically "in a shambles" at the end of 1998, and U.S. officials asked Mexico's commanding generals to come up with a new plan, following which they would talk about "whether we want to support that plan" (NYT, "Not Curtailed," Dec. 23, 1998).
About six weeks later, that plan was presented. Mexico's Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida Ochoa "who analysts say has [President Ernesto] Zedillo's backing as the governing party's [PRI] presidential candidate" (NYT, "Mexico Opponents See Politics in Clinton Visit," Feb. 14, 1999), (a backing which, historically, has nearly always catapulted the recipient into the presidential seat) "made the announcement with the Secretaries of Defense and Navy and the Attorney General" of Mexico (NYT, "Mexico Announces 'Total War' on Narcotics," Feb. 5, 1999). Calling it "the most ambitious anti-drug effort that has ever been undertaken by our country," the plan earmarks "$400 million to $500 million over three years to buy new planes ("equipped with radar and infrared cameras to track suspected drug planes,") ships, radar and other military and law enforcement equipment"(NYT, "Total War," Feb. 5, 1999). Added to the $1 billion which Mexico spends already on "anti-narcotics operations and purchases," the $160 million allotted for this year "represent[s] a significant increase" (NYT, "Total War," Feb. 5, 1999). However, according to one American official, "Themost useful new equipment. . .may be trucks equipped with large-scale radar for deployment at the border or along strategic highways to conduct electronic searches of cargo trailers" (NYT, "Total War," Feb. 5, 1999). The timing of the initiative and its "somewhat extravagant description" suggested that its goal may have been to influence the Clinton Administration in its upcoming certification recommendation and Clinton's personal visit to Mexico nine days later.
This visit did not have as its sole purpose the analyzation of the drug regime in Mexico. "Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister Juan Rebolledo Goot said. . .that Mexico hoped to focus the talks on immigration, trade and other issues" (NYT, "Mexico Opponents See Politics in Clinton Visit," Feb. 14, 1999). "But because the visit comes two weeks before [the recertification process], narcotics will probably dominate" (NYT, "Politics," Feb. 14, 1999).
During the previous year, Mexico's fight against drugs looked "especially bad" (NYT, "U.S. Is Brushing Off Mexico's Drug Data," Feb. 14, 1999). Drug seizures had fallen significantly. Many kingpins that the U.S. had already identified remained at large. Mexico had failed to extradite several prominent drug suspects, after promising to do so (a good illustration of Mexico's territorial sovereignty). And public conflicts had hurt existing drug enforcement programs (NYT, "Brushing Off," Feb. 14, 1999). However, Mexico still expected to become recertified, as "to observe the law strictly and possibly impose the economic penalties it contemplates. . .would be to place a strategic and complex relationship at risk for just one of the many interests that the United States has in Mexico" (NYT, "Brushing Off," Feb. 14, 1999). Besides, "the yearly 'certification' process has become more of a joint public-relations campaign aimed at the Congress than an objective appraisal"(NYT, "Brushing Off," Feb. 14, 1999). This prompted a New York Times editorial calling for an end to the process, condemning it as "an annual exercise in hypocrisy. . .which force[s] the Administration to choose between damaging relations with American allies and whitewashing their poor performance" (NYT, "Judging the Mexican Drug War," Feb. 15, 1999). Nonetheless, there were some indications of progress in Mexico, since "the establishment of elite anti-drug units within the army and the federal police has led to closer working relationships with the CIA, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI" (NYT, "Brushing Off," Feb. 14, 1999).
The visit, held in Merida, Mexico at a hacienda owned by prominent Mexican banker Roberto Hernandez, was Clinton's first foreign visit since his Senate impeachment acquittal on February 12. Afterwards, in an interview with reporters, though "he did not answer directly," he "left little doubt about his intentions" concerning Mexico's upcoming certification (NYT "Clinton Indicates He Will Support Mexico on Drugs," Feb. 16, 1999). "I want to acknowledge Mr. Zedillo's efforts in Mexico's interests to root out this scourge," he said to a gathering of Mexican and American officials. (NYT, "Clinton," Feb. 14, 1999). "Let's not forget that what we know in America comes largely from Mexico's brave efforts to get to the truth and air it. Mexico should not be penalized for having the courage to confront its problems" (NYT, "Clinton," Feb. 14, 1999). During meetings "Sunday evening and on Monday" (February 14-15, 1999), Clinton and members of his administration listened while Zedillo's aides, led by Francisco Labastida, summarized Mexico's recent drug efforts and discussed the new $500 million initiative (NYT, "Clinton," Feb. 14, 1999). President Zedillo then spoke, calling the plan "the most ambitious strategy in our history of combating narcotics. . .We've undertaken this fight because we know its [sic] our duty and because we know it's the duty of all nations" (NYT, "Clinton," Feb. 14, 1999). "The fundamental question," Clinton said, summing up his response about whether he would recommend Mexico's recertification to Congress, "is: would we be better off fighting it [the drug war] together or separately?" (NYT, "Clinton," Feb. 14, 1999).
Back in Washington, Drug Enforcement Administration chief Thomas Constantine testified before the Senate on February 24 about the narcotics situation in Mexico. He "sketched a bleak picture," making "clear that Mexico had yet to staunch the flow of cocaine, heroin and marijuana across the U.S. border" and stressing "that almost no traffickers of significance had been arrested and or [sic] extradited" (NYT, "D.E.A. Chief Warns Senate on Traffickers in Mexico," Feb. 25, 1999). He also "described a corruption so widespread that even sensitive information shared with elite anti-drug units reached traffickers" (NYT, "D.E.A.," Feb. 25, 1999). However, he stopped short of addressing "the central question of the level of official cooperation that Mexico has offered to the United States," or declaring "whether Mexico deserved to be certified" (NYT, "D.E.A.," Feb. 25, 1999). Rand Beers, "assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law-enforcement affairs," also testified. He implied that in order for Mexico to lose its certification, it would have to perform in a manner similar to Colombia, "which was denied certification after President Ernesto Samper had been accused of taking drug money for his re-election campaign" (NYT, "D.E.A.," Feb. 25, 1999).
Not surprisingly, on February 26, President Clinton certified Mexico as a "fully cooperative all[y] in fighting illegal drugs" (NYT, "U.S. Gives Colombia and Mexico Nod on Drugs," Feb.27, 1999). Interestingly, Colombia, which had previously been denied certification, was also certified, along with "twenty-two other countries identified with drug production or trafficking," with significant improvements in Pakistan which cut opium cultivation by 26 percent and Peru and Bolivia where coca leaf cultivation had fallen by 26 percent and 17 percent respectively (NYT, "Nod," Feb. 27, 1999). Countries denied certification but with the economic sanctions waived were Cambodia, Haiti, Nigeria and Paraguay, while Afghanistan and Myanmar "which together supply 90 percent of the world's opium," were denied certification outright. (NYT, "Nod," Feb. 27, 1999).
These decisions highlight the underlying factors concerning certification. "Washington already has frosty relations" with the only two countries that were denied certification. No economic balance was lost there anyway. The countries that were not denied economic sanctions have some other aspect which is too important to forego. And countries such as Mexico, with corruption perhaps extending as far as the defense minister General Enrique Cervantes (NYT, "Top Mexican Off-Limits to U.S. Drug Agents," Mar. 16, 1999), are courted in an effort to retain the healthy economic ties which already exist. This belies the purpose of the certification law, which was originally intended to give the U.S. narcotics policy more teeth during its War on Drugs during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead, under the Clinton administration, it has become little more than a tokenary acknowledgment of which drug-related countries the U.S. likes and which it does not. So, was the recertification of Mexico rational? Probably. Is the certification process itself rational? Probably not.
(All sources listed are from the New York Times).
December 23, 1998. "U.S. Help for Mexican Military Has Not Curtailed Drug Traffic." Tim Golden.
January 11, 1999. "Cocaine Doesn't Just 'Transit': Some of it Seeps." Ginger Thompson.
January 26, 1999. "John Paul Tells Mexicans That Faith Must Overcome Corruption." Alessandra Stanley.
February 5, 1999. "Mexico Announces 'Total War' on Narcotics." Sam Dillon.
February 14, 1999. "Mexico Opponents See Politics in Clinton Visit." Sam Dillon.
February 14, 1999. "U.S. Is Brushing Off Mexico's Drug Data." Tim Golden with Christopher Wren.
February 15, 1999. "Judging the Mexican Drug War." Editorial. February 16, 1999. "Clinton Indicates He Will Support Mexico on Drugs." Sam Dillon February 18, 1999. "Drug Problem Is Ours." Letter to the Editor-Emmett Barcalow. February 19, 1999. "San Luis Potosi Journal; Mexico's Troubadours Turn From Amor to Drugs." Sam Dillon February 25, 1999. "D.E.A. Chief Warns Senate on Traffickers in Mexico."
Christopher S. Wren. February 27, 1999. "U.S. Gives Colombia and Mexico Nod on Drugs." ChristopherS. Wren.
March 16, 1999. "Top Mexican Off-Limits to U.S. Drug Agents." Tim Golden.
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