Article I: Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States. . . (1)
Why? What were the historical events which led to a biennial election of these congresspersons? Why not annual, semiannual, triennial, or decennial elections? Why not monthly, bimonthly or weekly? While there were proposals for annual and triennial elections of representatives, a biennial establishment eventually won out as a compromise during the Constitutional Convention of 1787. It was later defended as a safe and effective measure by James Madison in The Federalist during the ratification debate which ensued.
On May 29, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia presented James Madison's plan consisting of fifteen resolutions known as the Virginia Plan. The first of these resolutions proposed that the Articles of Confederation be "corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution." (2)
In effect, this plan resulted in the scrapping of the Articles of Confederation and the establishment of a new government. The fourth of the resolutions read in part:
Resolved: that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every for the term of ; to be of the age of years at least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service. . . (3)
Here is the first mention of a term of office for these legislators, although as yet the blanks indicating the length of the term are unfilled. During the ensuing debate on this and the other resolutions, debate concerning the details of the fourth resolution were postponed on May 31. (4)
On June 12, Delegates Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth moved to fill the blank with the words one year, intending to bring on some question. (5) John Rutledge and Daniel Jennifer then brought forward proposals of two and three years, respectively. James Madison and Elbridge Gerry then briefly debated triennial vs. annual elections. Madison argued that a triennial election was necessary for representatives to learn the laws of states other than their own, to increase stability, and to allow travel time between the seat of government and the representatives' constituencies. Gerry claimed that the people would not give up the idea of annual elections. He considered annual elections to be "the only defense of the people against tyranny," and stated that "he was as much against a triennial House as against a hereditary executive." (6) Madison responded that the people were not aware of what was going on at the convention, that it was impossible to know what the people thought, and that they "ought to consider what was right and necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper government." The motion for a triennial election then passed seven states to four. (7)
Nine days later, on June 21, a biennial system was instituted. Edmund Randolph proposed the change. He personally preferred annual elections, which were the norm in most states of the Union, but for the inconvenience of travel, he compromised with a biennial system. John Dickinson then argued that a biennial system would still be too inconvenient and proposed a triennial system with one-third of legislators up for election each year. Oliver Ellsworth and Caleb Strong then moved and seconded a proposal for one year, since "the people were fond of frequent elections. James Wilson then argued for an annual system, stating that annual elections would not be too inconvenient since the people had annual meetings anyway, and since the national legislature would not have to meet more than three to six months each year. James Madison contended that a triennial system was necessary. The necessary travel time would greatly inconvenience the representatives. In addition, it was necessary for new representatives to have time to learn the affairs of other states. Roger Sherman commented that he preferred annual elections, though biennial would do. Representatives should mix with their constituencies in their home states. A triennial system would result in their becoming too much absorbed with the manners of the seat of government. George Mason then pointed out that with annual elections, the middle states would have an unfair advantage, since they could more easily visit their districts than could those representing states which were further away. He supported a biennial system. Finally, Alexander Hamilton urged a triennial system, claiming it would balance the dependency on the people. He also remarked that too frequent elections tended to result in apathy among the people, resulting in low voter turnout, a situation currently existing in all the states and forcing severe regulations in Virginia. A vote for a biennial election was than called, and passed seven to three, with New Jersey divided. (8)
At this point, the debate over the length of terms of office for representatives concluded in the convention. However, the Constitution still had to be ratified by the several states.
Compromising with the delegates was one thing. Convincing the people was another. Here again, James Madison played a key role. Under the pen name of Publius, he wrote a number of papers urging the ratification of the Constitution. Along with similar writings by Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, these essays are known as The Federalist. Papers 52 and 53, published in New York newspapers on the 9th and 12th of February 1788 were especially relevant in promoting a biennial election of representatives as protecting the people's liberties and as being an effective method (9).
By appealing to examples from Great Britain, Ireland, and Virginia, James Madison attempted to prove in The Federalist 52 that the liberties of the people will be protected in a biennial system. From the history of Great Britain, Madison shows that "the greatest frequency of elections. . .necessary. . .for binding the representatives to their constituents does not exceed a triennial return of them." Biennial elections, therefore, "cannot possibly be dangerous" to the constituents. Madison also shows that in Virginia, even a septennial system was safe, proving further the security of a biennial system. He concludes that since the legislature will receive limited power, be controlled by the legislatures, and be much more answerable to the people than the other branches of government, they "can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other." (10)
Madison's secondary argument in The Federalist 53 is that biennial elections are useful and necessary. Madison begins by refuting the argument "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins," by referring to the terms of the legislatures of the states, which ranged from Connecticut and Rhode Island at six months to South Carolina at two years and asking if there was any real difference in quality of governance or liberties afforded the people among these states. He then shows, using the case of Great Britain as a counter-example, the importance of frequent elections to a free government. But why a two-year system? Madison gives several convincing arguments, some of which he had used in the Convention eight months previously. He comments on the need of legislators to have time to learn the ropes of a federal government He asks: if it takes one year to effectively work in a state legislature, wouldn't it take two years in a federal legislature? He argues that this time is necessary because of the variation of laws from state to state and the need for legislators to learn the laws of neighboring states. In addition, it would be needful for representatives to learn of the ways of other countries so that they could deal effectively with foreign affairs. As in the Convention, Madison remarks on the need for legislators to have more time in order to visit with their constituents. Finally, he remarks that a biennial system would be effective in thwarting potential problems, such as new legislators being taken advantage of by their more seasoned colleagues and fraud. He concludes that a biennial system would be "as useful to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberties of the people." (11)
Antifederalists argued against the increase of the length of terms from one year (under the Articles) to two years, claiming that this system would remove representatives from their constituents. These consequences were especially important since the Constitution also removed Confederation safeguards such as the mandatory rotation in office and a recall by state legislatures. (12)
However, on July 2, 1788, Virginia became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution, (13) putting it into effect according to Article VII. The Constitution, with all its articles and sections, including that members of the House of Representatives be chosen every second year by the people, became the law of the land.
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist. Rev. ed., The Colonial Press: New York, 1901.
Hunt, Gaillard and James Brown Scott, eds. The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America Reported by James Madison, A Delegate from the State of Virginia. Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 1920.
Kaminski, John P. and Richard Leffler eds., Federalists and Antifederalists: The Debate over the Ratification of the Constitution, Madison House: Madison, Wisconsin, 1989.
Rossiter, Clinton. 1787: The Grand Convention. The MacMillan Company: New York, 1966.
Washington, George, et. al., The Constitution of the United States, 1787.
1. Washington, George, et. al., The Constitution of the United States, 1787.
2. Hunt, Gaillard and James Brown Scott, eds. The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America Reported by James Madison, A Delegate from the State of Virginia. Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 1920, p. 23.
3. ibid., 24.
4. ibid., 34.
5. ibid., 91.
6. Ibid., 91.
7. ibid., 92.
8. ibid., 144-146.
9. Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist. Rev. ed., The Colonial Press: New York, 1901.
Kaminski, John P. and Richard Leffler eds., Federalists and Antifederalists: The Debate over the Ratification of the Constitution, Madison House: Madison, Wisconsin, 1989.
10. Kaminski, 52-54; Hamilton et. al. 289-293.
11. Kaminski 54-58; Hamilton et. al. 294-299.
12. Kaminski, 38.
13. Rossiter, Clinton. 1787: The Grand Convention. The MacMillan Company: New York, 1966, p. 292.
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